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Will Roe v. Wade Survive the Rehnquist Court?
Dawn Johnaen* and Marcy Wilder**
Whether the Supreme Court will overrule Roe v. Wade' has been
the subject of a great deal of speculation during the months following
the election of George Bush as President of the United States. This
sudden and dramatic concern for women's reproductive freedom is well
founded. A few weeks before the opening of the Supreme Court's term
last October, Justice Blackmun, author of the decision, issued a dire
warning: "The next question is, 'Will Roe v. Wade go down the drain?'
I think there's a very distinct possibility that it will - this term. You
can count the votes."'
By the beginning of January 1989, the Court had been presented
with requests to hear seven abortion cases. Each case was filed as a
result of actions by state courts or legislatures seeking to severely re-
strict women's access to abortion services. The Supreme Court has thus
far agreed to hear one of these cases: Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services.' Both the United States Justice Department and the State of
Missouri have asked the Court to use Webster as a vehicle for over-
turning Roe v. Wade.
What can we expect the Supreme Court to do in Webster and
other abortion cases? What is the likely future of women's constitu-
tional right to choose abortion? How have we come to the point where
women's right to choose is in jeopardy?
The Supreme Court issued its historic decision in Roe v. Wade on
January 22, 1973. In Roe, the Court declared for the first time that the
constitutional right of every woman to liberty and privacy includes the
right to make the highly personal decision, free from government inter-
ference, whether to have an abortion. The Court's recognition of
* Legal Director, National Abortion Rights Action League. B.A. Yale University,
1983; J.D. Yale Law School, 1986.
** Staff Attorney, National Abortion Rights Action League (Revson Fellow in
Women's Law and Public Policy, Georgetown University Law Center). B.A. Union
College, 1985; J.D. Stanford Law School, 1988.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Wash. Post, Sept. 1, 1988, at A3, col. 4.
3. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir.), prob. juris.
noted, 109 S. Ct. 780 (1989).
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women's right to choose abortion flowed logically and directly from its
1965 and subsequent decisions ruling that every American has the
right to decide whether and when to have children, including the right
to use birth control.4
Since 1973, and as recently as 1986,' the Supreme Court has con-
sistently applied this principle in striking down a variety of state laws
restricting abortion. Throughout these cases, the Court has never wa-
vered from the position that women have a fundamental right to choose
to end an unwanted pregnancy. The government may not interfere with
a woman's abortion decision in order to protect fetal life until after the
fetus is viable - that is, potentially capable of "meaningful life"'
outside of the woman's womb - which occurs at approximately the
end of the second trimester.
Given the Supreme Court's consistent support for women's right to
choose, the existence of a credible threat to reproductive freedom in the
Court is extraordinary. A fundamental tenet that guides the Court's
decisionmaking is a firm adherence to the principle of stare decisis:
once the Court has decided a legal issue, that decision becomes prece-
dent which the Court will apply in all future cases. Because of the
great importance of stability and predictability in the law, as well as
the impracticality, indeed impossibility, of continually deciding the
same legal issues anew, the Court will not overrule precedent even if it
believes that its prior treatment of an issue was incorrect. Although the
Court has the power to overrule its prior cases and has on occasion
departed from the rule of stare decisis, it does so only in extraordinary
circumstances, such as where a clearly wrong decision is causing grave
injustice.
In a 1983 decision, the Court specifically addressed the application
of the principle of stare decisis to Roe and women's right to choose
abortion, finding "especially compelling reasons for adhering to stare
decisis in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade."'7 The Court noted
that Roe "was considered with special care" and that the Court has
"repeatedly and consistently" reaffirmed Roe in subsequent decisions.
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
5. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986).
6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
7. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420
n.1 (1983).
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Grave injustice would result not from reaffirming Roe but from
overruling the decision. No other judicial decision has had a more
profound and positive effect on the lives and health of American
women than Roe v. Wade. Before the Court recognized that abortion is
a constitutionally protected choice, an estimated one million women
each year resorted to illegal abortion, risking their lives and health in
order to retain control over their futures. Prior to 1973, thousands of
American women died as a direct result of criminal abortion. Denying
women access to legal and safe abortion would guarantee two things:
that many women would die or find themselves seriously injured be-
cause of botched illegal abortions, and that more children would grow
up in an environment where they were not wanted. Far from causing
injustice that would argue for reversal, Roe has saved women's lives
and preserved their families.
In addition, public opinion is strongly in favor of women's right to
choose abortion. The vast majority of women and men in the United
States believe that a woman, and not the government, should decide
whether and when she will bear a child. A 1988 poll commissioned by
the National Abortion Rights Action League and jointly conducted by
Hickman-Maslin Research, Inc. and American Viewpoint found that
78 % of Americans agreed with the statement: "Abortion is a private
issue between a woman, her family and her doctor. The government
should not be involved." 8 Given the many lives that Roe has saved, the
many more lives that Roe has improved, the overwhelming popular
support for the decision, and the sixteen years of Supreme Court prece-
dent affirming women's constitutional right to choose, how has this
right come under such an enormous and immediate threat?
The anti-abortion movement has developed and vigorously pursued
a legal strategy for depriving women of their constitutional right to
choose abortion. The strategy is summarized in an essay by Victor Ro-
senblum and Thomas Marzen in Abortion and the Constitution: Re-
versing Roe v. Wade Through the Courts:
There appear to be only three essential prerequisites [to overturn-
ing Roe]: statutes that confront the judiciary with abortion-related
issues must continue to be enacted; these statutes must be compe-
8. This question was part of a poll of 1202 registered voters in the continental
United States which was conducted from December 13 through December 17, 1987. A
full report containing an analysis of the results of the survey was released on January
18, 1988 and is available from NARAL.
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tently and vigorously defended; and the membership of the Su-
preme Court has to be altered so at least five justices are reasona-
bly open to the possibility of reversing Roe.'
The anti-choice minority has proven extremely resourceful and
creative in pursuing the first two steps of this plan: they have lobbied
successfully for the enactment of unconstitutional anti-abortion legisla-
tion at the state level, which has enabled them to bring the issue re-
peatedly before the Supreme Court. Although seven Justices joined the
decision in Roe, by the time of the Court's most recent abortion deci-
sion in 1986, the pro-choice majority had narrowed to five. President
Reagan's subsequent appointment of Justice Kennedy to the Court may
have achieved the crucial third step in the anti-choice strategy - the
creation of a majority on the Supreme Court willing to contemplate
overruling Roe.
During his two terms in office, President Reagan appointed three
Supreme Court Justices and over half of all lower federal court judges.
Both Ronald Reagan and George Bush were elected President upon
Republican Party platforms that make hostility toward women's repro-
ductive rights a requirement for nomination to the federal judiciary.
The 1988 Republican Party platform calls for "the appointment of
judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family val-
ues and the sanctity of innocent human life." The "innocent human
life" that the platform refers to is fetal life; notably excluded and im-
plicitly deemed unworthy of respect and legal protection are the lives of
women.
While anti-choice extremists lobbied to push unconstitutional
"test" legislation through state legislatures, and President Reagan ap-
pointed Justices and judges with an eye toward an anti-choice position
on abortion, the pro-choice majority remained relatively silent. The
public did not, and largely still does not, recognize the gravity of the
threat. This is in part because the vast majority of anti-abortion legisla-
tion and litigation since Roe has not sought to criminalize abortion out-
right, but to impose restrictions that would make the abortion proce-
dure less available and more costly, or would somehow interfere with
women's decisionmaking process. Even now, neither the press nor the
public adequately appreciates the harm that would result were the
9. Rosenblum & Marzen, Strategies for Reversing ROE V. WADE through the
Courts, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH
THE COURTS 195, 209 (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunningham eds. 1987).
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Court to uphold such restrictions on access to abortion. Political com-
mentators fixate on whether the Court will overrule Roe or "just" chip
away gradually at the right to choose. Implicit in this question is an
assumption that to overrule Roe the Court must deny the existence of
any constitutionally protected right to choose abortion. This is a flawed
and dangerous interpretation of Roe that seriously minimizes the
harms that would result from allowing state restrictions on abortion.
Anti-abortion activists recognize that criminalization is not the
only way to eliminate choice. Instead of directly attacking the existence
of women's right to choose, their strategy has focused on imposing on-
erous regulations that interfere with women's access to abortion until
all choice is effectively eliminated. If the Supreme Court were to up-
hold such restrictions, it could overrule Roe, at least in part, without
any public admission that it was depriving women of their constitu-
tional rights.
In the past, the Supreme Court has vigorously rejected back-
handed attempts to undermine the foundation of the right to choose.
The Constitution prohibits not only laws that would criminalize abor-
tion, but also, as the Court recognized in Roe itself, unwarranted gov-
ernment "regulation" and "interference" with abortion services and
women's abortion decisions. That is why the very day the Court struck
down a Texas abortion law in Roe, it also declared a more liberal
Georgia law to be unconstitutional in Doe v. Bolton.'0 In Doe, the
Court ruled that a state could not require that all abortions be per-
formed in hospitals or that a woman secure the approval of a hospital
committee and three doctors before she could obtain an abortion.
In the sixteen years since Roe, the Supreme Court has applied the
reasoning in that decision in striking down a wide variety of restrictive
abortion laws. For example, the Court has invalidated state laws that
required women to obtain their husbands' consent prior to having an
abortion,"1 that forced women to wait a specified period of time before
obtaining abortion services,12 that required the procedure to be per-
formed in hospitals," and that imposed biased or lengthy and inflexible
informed consent requirements.' 4 The Court's decisions since 1973
10. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
11. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-71 (1976).
12. Akron, 462 U.S. at 450-51.
13. Id. at 433; Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1983);
Doe, 410 U.S. at 195-200.
14. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759-63; Akron, 462 U.S. at 442.
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make absolutely clear that Roe protects women from state laws that
seek to interfere with their access to abortion services or with their
decisionmaking process, as well as from laws that criminalize abortion.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rejected challenges to abor-
tion laws in two important areas: the rights of minors to obtain abor-
tions without parental involvement 5 and public funding of abortions.1 6
Although these decisions undeniably are contrary to the reproductive
freedom of young women and poor women, in each of these areas the
Court reaffirmed the basic principle that the government may not inter-
fere with an adult woman's right to decide whether to end a pregnancy.
Although the Court ruled that a state may require some "immature"
minors to obtain parental consent prior to having abortions, this deci-
sion was based on a subsequently disproved factual assumption that
government-mandated parental involvement is beneficial to some mi-
nors who are too immature to make decisions about abortion on their
own. 7 In the public funding cases, the Court reaffirmed that the Con-
stitution prohibits the government from imposing obstacles in the path
of a woman's choice of abortion. The Court found, however, that the
government may refuse to remove obstacles to abortion that the gov-
ernment did not itself create, such as a woman's indigence. Thus, even
in these cases the Court declared again that the Constitution guaran-
tees women's fundamental right to choose abortion.
The seven abortion cases that have been presented to the Supreme
Court this term follow the pattern of indirect attempts to deprive
women of their reproductive rights. Each of the cases involves severe
state-imposed restrictions on abortion, many of which are identical to
those that the Court has already held unconstitutional in prior cases. If
the Court were now to declare that these restrictions are constitutional,
it could drastically curtail women's reproductive choices without ruling
explicitly that women have no constitutional right to choose abortion.
Some state legislatures would restrict abortion to the point that not a
single facility that performed abortions existed in the state, while in
other states regulations could drive the cost so high that many women
15. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93; see also Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-42; H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
16. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
17. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986), affd, Nos. 86-
5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. (Aug. 27, 1987), vacated and reh'g granted, 835 F.2d
1545 (per curiam), rev'd, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for cert.
filed, Jan. 5, 1989.
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could not afford the procedure.
Pro-choice attorneys were successful in convincing the Supreme
Court not to hear the first three abortion cases presented this term,
Conn v. Conn from Indiana and Lewis v. Lewis and Myers v. Lewis
from Michigan.18 These cases were orchestrated by anti-abortion activ-
ists and filed on behalf of men seeking court orders to prevent their
wives from obtaining abortions. The men sought to create a constitu-
tional right that would enable a man who has impregnated a woman to
obtain a court order forcing that woman to bear a child for him against
her will. A woman, in their view, should be able to obtain an abortion
only after disclosing to a court her highly personal reasons for wanting
to terminate her pregnancy. After the woman has testified for the pub-
lic record and submitted to cross-examination, if she has convinced the
judge that her reasons for not wanting to bear a child are "better" than
the man's stated motive for seeking to compel the childbirth, the judge
may then permit the woman to have an abortion.
Men have brought over a dozen cases like these in state courts
since May 1988. Although some men were "successful" in obtaining
temporary court orders and delaying women's abortions, every appel-
late court to address the issue ruled in favor of the woman's right to
make the abortion decision. The men argued that they could prevail
without an overruling of any of the Supreme Court's abortion cases.
All appellate courts agreed, however, that what the men were request-
ing directly conflicted with Roe, as well as with the 1976 Supreme
Court decision, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, in which the Court
struck down a Missouri law prohibiting married women from having
abortions without the consent of their husbands.19 As the lower courts
recognized, a decision in favor of one of the men would have taken the
abortion decision away from the pregnant woman and placed the power
to decide in the hands of her husband or sexual partner and the state
court.
Moreover, despite their rhetoric about men's rights, the ultimate
goal of the anti-choice lawyers behind these cases was clear: once they
18. Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391
(1988); Lewis v. Lewis, No. 111440 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1988), appeal denied
No. 841469 (Mich. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1988), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S.
Nov. 29, 1988) (No. 88-683); Myers v. Lewis, No. 111440 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15,
1988), appeal denied No. 841469 (Mich. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1988), cert. denied, 57
U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1988) (No. 88-555).
19. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52.
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reached the Supreme Court, they asked the Court to overrule Roe v.
Wade and declare that women possess no right to choose. This would
obviously deny every woman the right to choose abortion (even where
her husband or sexual partner agreed with her decision) and give that
power to the government. The Supreme Court's refusal to hear the hus-
bands' cases left undisturbed state decisions that protected women's
constitutional right to decide whether or not to have children.
The facts of those cases graphically demonstrate why the abortion
decision must be left to the woman in each and every instance and not
subject to the review of a court. At the time Mr. Conn and Mr. Lewis
filed their lawsuits, their marriages had failed. Their wives were in the
process of filing for divorce and each was already caring for an infant.
One of the women was desperately trying to escape an abusive relation-
ship with her now ex-husband, who has been arrested repeatedly for
physically beating, harassing and threatening to kill her. Although both
women ultimately were free to have abortions, the lawsuits cost them a
great deal: in addition to the violation of their constitutional rights,
these women suffered increased medical risk because of the delay in
obtaining abortions - one woman was under court order for seven
weeks and the other for five weeks. Moreover, both women were forced
to endure the extreme emotional trauma that results from an unwanted
pregnancy and a court order preventing abortion, as well as extensive
unwanted publicity about their private lives and decisions.
The Supreme Court's decisions not to take these cases, although
clearly a victory for supporters of reproductive rights, provide little in-
dication of what the Court is likely to do in the Webster case,2 0 or the
other abortion cases pending before the Court. In Lewis and Conn, the
anti-choice lawyers had particularly weak legal arguments. The men
were arguing for the creation of a wholly unprecedented constitutional
right; their claims were not based on a state law seeking to give hus-
bands a right to interfere with their wive's abortion decisions. By con-
trast, the abortion restrictions at issue in Webster and other cases the
Court may consent to hear are not dependent on some nonexistent con-
stitutional right; rather, they have been enacted by State legislatures
into law.
The Missouri legislature enacted the law at issue in Webster in
1986, despite the fact that some of the abortion restrictions it contained
were identical to provisions that the Supreme Court had already de-
20. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir.), prob.
juris. noted, No. 88-605 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1989).
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clared to be unconstitutional. The statute's assault on women's right to
choose abortion begins in the preamble, which states that "the life of
each human being begins at conception" and that "unborn children
have protectable interests in life, health and well-being." This state-
ment clearly conflicts with Roe, in which the Supreme Court unequivo-
cally declared that a state may not adopt a theory of when life begins
in order to restrict abortion. Although the preamble acknowledges that
Missouri must follow the Supreme Court's decisions and cannot create
fetal rights that override women's reproductive rights, this provision
makes evident what motivated the Missouri legislature in enacting the
law.
One of the questions before the Supreme Court in Webster is the
basic question, first decided in Roe, whether women have a fundamen-
tal right to choose abortion. The Missouri attorney general has asked
the Court to uphold the law's restrictions on abortion by overruling
Roe. In an extraordinary move, just two days after the presidential
election, the U.S. Solicitor General filed a brief urging the Court to
hear Webster and arguing that the case was an appropriate vehicle for
overruling Roe: "If the Court is prepared to reconsider Roe v. Wade,
this case presents an appropriate opportunity for doing so."21
Although a majority of the Justices are not likely to rule in Web-
ster that women have no constitutionally protected right to choose
abortion, even a "narrow" win in the Supreme Court for Missouri
would greatly interfere with women's access to abortion services. The
Missouri law forbids public employees to participate in the perform-
ance of abortions even if a woman pays for the full costs of the proce-
dure and no public funds are involved. The law also prohibits women
from having abortions performed at public health care facilities, even
in cases in which the procedure is performed by a private physician and
is fully paid for by the woman. The effects of this law would be devas-
tating in areas where public facilities are the sole abortion providers. In
Missouri, for example, one public facility was responsible for ninety-
seven percent of all post-fifteen-week, hospital-based abortions in 1985,
the year before the statute was enacted.22 Obtaining an abortion in
such areas would require traveling long distances, many times to other
states, which would in turn cause delay, increased health risks and
higher costs. Another provision of the law that was invalidated by the
21. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 12,
Webster (No. 88-605).
22. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 428 n.57.
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lower courts but not appealed by the state mandated that all abortions
performed after fifteen weeks gestational age must be performed in a
hospital. The combined effect of this hospitalization requirement and
the provision prohibiting the performance of abortions at the one hospi-
tal responsible for virtually all post-fifteen-week hospital abortions,
would have been to render abortion completely unavailable in the state
of Missouri after fifteen weeks.
The statute also attempts to restrict the availability of information
about abortion by prohibiting the use of public funds "for the purpose
of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not neces-
sary to save her life." This would prevent some women from obtaining
information they need in order to make informed and intelligent medi-
cal decisions. A woman who is dependent upon public support for her
medical needs, and suffers from a medical condition that makes preg-
nancy extremely dangerous to her health, could suffer irreparable phys-
ical harm as a result of this restriction.
The final restriction involved in Missouri's appeal requires that
prior to performing an abortion in cases in which a physician "has rea-
son to believe" that the fetus is of twenty or more weeks gestational
age, the physician must first determine fetal viability by "such tests as
are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and lung
maturity of the unborn child." Requiring these specific findings would
raise. the cost of abortions and force women to undergo invasive tests,
often without any possibility of gaining any useful information about
fetal viability. Both the Missouri district court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that all of the provisions of the
law involved in this appeal are unconstitutional.
The second case currently before the Court, Turnock v. Ragsdale,
involves a series of Illinois statutes and regulations that, like the law in
Webster, interfere with women's access to abortion services. 23 The laws
demand that all facilities performing abortions be licensed and comply
with onerous structural, equipment, and staffing requirements. Both the
Illinois district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found that the requirements demand the construction of "the
functional equivalent of small hospitals" and are unrelated to the per-
formance of safe abortions. Complying with the regulations is very
costly and would force some would-be abortion providers out of the
field. Among other anti-abortion provisions is a requirement that the
23. Turnock v. Ragsdale, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir.), appeal filed, 57 U.S.L.W.
3378 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1988) (No. 88-790).
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individual giving abortion counseling "have no financial interest in the
patient's decision." This would typically preclude the doctor performing
the abortion from providing counseling, again raising the cost of pro-
viding the abortion as well as disrupting the physician-patient
relationship.
The two remaining cases differ significantly from Webster and
Ragsdale in that they involve the abortion rights only of minors. At
issue in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health is an Ohio law
that severely restricts minors' access to abortion services." The statute
requires a physician to give twenty-four-hour notice to a minor's parent
or guardian before performing an abortion. A minor may avoid paren-
tal notification only by using a "judicial bypass procedure," through
which she must convince a court that she is mature enough to make her
own abortion decision or that having an abortion is in her best interest.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the statute
is unconstitutional because the judicial bypass procedure is extremely
difficult to implement, it does not protect the minor's anonymity, and it
would result in dangerous delays because the procedure can take up to
twenty-two days to complete.
Because the Court believed that some minors may be incapable of
making the decision independently, it has held that states may require
some minors to involve their parents in the abortion decision. The
Court also has ruled, however, that if a state requires a minor to obtain
her parent's consent before having an abortion, it must provide a by-
pass procedure through which a minor may demonstrate that she is
mature enough to make her own decision or that her best interests
would not be served by parental involvement. The state of Ohio argues
in its current appeal not only that its judicial bypass procedure is con-
stitutionally adequate, but also that it need not provide any bypass at
all. If the Court adopts Ohio's reasoning, states could require every
minor to involve her parents in her decision to have an abortion, even a
minor whose parents are physically abusive or whose pregnancy was
the result of a rape by her father.
The final case currently pending before the Court, Hodgson v.
Minnesota, involves a law that requires a minor to notify both of her
parents prior to having an abortion, even if her parents are divorced or
24. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D.
Ohio 1986), affd sub nom. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d
852 (6th Cir. 1988), appeal filed sub nom. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 57 U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1988) (No. 88-805).
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have never married and even if one parent objects to the notification of
the other.25 The statute makes no exception for non-custodial parents
who have never met the minor, or who have been barred by a protective
order from visiting her. In addition, the statute prohibits a doctor from
performing an abortion until at least forty-eight hours after written no-
tice of the pending procedure has been delivered to the minor's parents.
Delays caused by the Minnesota law have forced some minors to have
more expensive, riskier procedures, and the percentage of minors hav-
ing second trimester abortions has increased since the law was
enacted. 6
During the five years the law has been in operation, nearly one-
half of all minors resorted to petitioning the court under the statute's
judicial bypass procedure, because they were either afraid or unable to
notify both parents of their abortion decision. 27 At trial, judges who
collectively had heard over ninety percent of the minors' petitions testi-
fied that the minors were indeed the best situated to consider their own
unique family circumstances and decide whether they should notify
their parents. 8 Prior to the law's enactment, a "sizable proportion of
minors seeking an abortion in Minnesota voluntarily notified at least
one parent," this proportion did not change after the statute took ef-
fect. 9 Twenty to twenty-five percent of those who used the judicial by-
pass procedure had already notified one parent, the vast majority of
whom were divorced women who had not seen their husbands in
years.30
After reviewing the evidence, the district court concluded that the
statute did not promote the state's interest in protecting minors or pro-
moting family integrity."1 The Eighth Circuit panel agreed, finding that
"although family relationships benefit from voluntary and open com-
munication, compelling parental notice has an opposite effect ... [i]t is
almost always disastrous."32 The pro-choice victory was short-lived: the
Eighth Circuit (on which a majority of the judges were appointed by
25. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), petition for
cert. filed, No. 88-1125 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1989).
26. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, Hodgson.
27. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (N.D. Minn. 1986).
28. Id. at 775.
29. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 114a-115a, 123a, 126a, Hodgson.
30. Id. at 769.
31. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 775.
32. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN, slip op. at 13 (8th Cir. Aug. 27,
1987).
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President Reagan) agreed to hear the case en banc and held, in the
face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the law was consti-
tutional.3 3 Nevertheless, the statue remains enjoined by order of the
Eighth Circuit, pending the review by the United States Supreme
Court.34
If the Supreme Court were to uphold the laws in Webster, Rag-
sdale, or Akron Center, it inevitably would have implications far be-
yond those cases for women's ability to choose and obtain abortions. It
will signal to anti-choice activists and legislators across the nation that
the Court will no longer uphold women's constitutional rights against
their assaults. Many states would enact highly restrictive abortion laws,
as they have in the past, aimed at barring women's access to the abor-
tion procedure. Hospitalization requirements, mandatory waiting peri-
ods, and onerous licensing requirements would all be employed in an
effort to eliminate entirely women's right to choose abortion. For
women who lack the money or ability to travel long distances, a law
that in effect prohibits all hospitals in an area from performing abor-
tions, and at the same time demands that the procedure be performed
in hospitals, could be as devastating as a law criminalizing abortion.
Will the Supreme Court overrule Roe v. Wade? Obviously only
the Court itself can provide the ultimate answer to that question. But it
is essential that the Court, the press and those who support reproduc-
tive freedom recognize that there is more than one way to overrule
Roe. Women's lives depend on the Supreme Court protecting women's
access to legal and safe abortion; it is not enough for the Court to pro-
fess support for a constitutional right that it has in fact rendered
meaningless.
33. Hodgson, 853 F.2d 1452.
34. Hodgson v. Minnesota, Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN (8th Cir. Oct. 7,
1988) (en banc) (order).
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